This chapter summarizes the latest (post-2012) eminent domain law in Taiwan. It focuses on the six pillars of takings law, namely public interest criteria, subjects of the eminent domain power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development surpluses, and the dispute resolution system. The 2012 reform brings along takings laws in books that are stricter than ever in terms of public interest and necessity analysis, but administrative courts typically defer to the administrative agencies' judgments. Only government agencies and certain public legal persons can apply to the state to condemn. Just compensation now means payment of current market value, but the differences between how much condemnees receive pre-and post-2012 remain unclear. Procedural requirements regarding expropriation constitute an intricate web of rules. Nonetheless, in the process of negotiated purchase, local governments are often criticized for not bargaining in good faith. Thus, the due process requirement does not guarantee substantive equity or efficiency. Development surpluses go entirely to the state. The dispute resolution system consists of two or three levels of re-examination within the administrative branch before the condemnees can bring their cases to the administrative court. This chapter concludes with a policy recommendation that uses hedonic regression models to estimate land value for offers in the negotiated purchase stage and for the land value in the takings compensation stage.
The Constitution of Taiwan fails to include a "just compensation" clause or a "public use" clause. Article 143, Section 1 of the Constitution of Taiwan does prescribe that " [a] ll land within the territory of the Republic of China shall belong to the whole body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in accordance with law, shall be protected and restricted by law. Privately-owned land shall be liable to taxation according to its value, and the Government may buy such land according to its value." As the final clause (buy…land) is interpreted as different from expropriation, the constitution provides little guidance in determining the scope and limit of eminent domain. However, the Constitutional Court is not entirely absent from this scene. In fact, in a number of constitutional interpretations, 1 the Constitutional Court constructed the constitutional mandate regarding the governmental use of the eminent domain power. Not all of the interpretations are equally influential. It should be fair to say that those on due process have shaped the evolution of takings law by prompting the revision of the relevant statutes formerly declared unconstitutional. By contrast, the interpretations regarding just compensation and public interest are more expressive than substantive, as the Constitutional Court has yet to advance concrete tests that the government or the administrative courts can apply in future cases.
As a result, eminent domain law in Taiwan is mainly statutory and regulatory.
The legislature and the administration have a wide discretion in shaping the takings law. In introducing the "Six Pillars" of the taking laws in Taiwan, this chapter draws heavily on statutes and administrative regulations, while also keeping an eye on decisions made by the administrative courts. Since the year 2000, the Land
Expropriation Act (hereinafter "LEA") has been the major source of law for takings of land and fixtures. Before then, expropriation stipulations were scattered in many different statutes. Now, pursuant to Article 1, Paragraphs 1-2 of the LEA, "Land expropriation shall be governed by this Act. Matters not provided in this Act shall be governed by other applicable laws. Where other laws are inconsistent with this Act with regard to expropriation procedures and expropriation compensation standards, this Act shall prevail." 2 Hence, this chapter frequently turns to the LEA and the regulations stipulated to complement the LEA.
In the LEA, 3 there are three types of expropriation: land expropriation, zone expropriation, and incidental expropriation. This chapter focuses on land expropriation, which is used in a broad swath of undertakings to condemn one or multiple land parcels. Zone expropriation is the condemnation of all land parcels in one specific area. The fundamentals of zone expropriations and land expropriation are the same, but zone expropriation can only be used in more limited circumstances (such as urban revitalization) and is subject to stricter procedural requirements. Due to limited space, zone expropriation will be covered only in Part VI, where the unique compensation options are summarized. Incidental expropriation refers to the condemnation of fixtures on the land. Its procedure is combined with that of land expropriation and zone expropriation. As such, incidental expropriation will be covered in the discussions of the six pillars below. Official statistics regarding the practice of land expropriation and zone expropriation in Taiwan from 2001 to 2013 are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 , respectively.
This chapter is divided into seven parts, the first six of which introduce the six pillars of eminent domain: public interest criteria, subjects of the eminent domain power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development surpluses, and the dispute resolution system. Before concluding, Part VII provides the author's own reform proposal of eminent domain law in Taiwan. Moreover, the also newly enacted Article 3-2 of the LEA requires a comprehensive assessment of the public interest and necessity of the takings project.
The legislature even lays out the variables to be considered: necessity of the takings project. In the several cases so far, courts appear to spill more ink on necessity than on public interest. Nonetheless, in every case the court concludes that the government has passed the tests. Thus, the more stringent requirements by the legislature may not have nudged the administrative courts to adopt a stricter review standard of the takings projects by the administrative branch.
III. SUBJECTS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER
Only the 
IV. JUST COMPENSATION
In Chang (2009 Chang ( , 2012 Chang ( , 2013b , I provide theoretical analysis and empirical examinations of takings compensation law in Taiwan in 1954-1977 and 1977-2012. One of the major changes in the 2012 revision of the LEA reformed the compensation law. Before the reform, land value was assessed by combining a pre-determined and under-assessed official land value with a pre-determined extra bonus. After the reform, market value of land should be used to compensate condemnees. While land value is a major component of the compensation package, it is not the only one.
Section A describes all the elements of takings compensation. Section B then focuses on how market value of land has been appraised since 2012. Section C surveys the judicial review of takings compensation cases.
A. The Elements of Takings Compensation
Total takings compensation includes that for land; constructional improvements (such as a house); agricultural improvements (such as trees); incurred expenses for land improvements; business losses; and relocation expenses. Takings compensation "shall be paid within fifteen days after the expiration of the public announcement period" (Article 20 of the LEA), and the public announcement period is 30 days after the city/county government, upon receiving the notice of approval from the Ministry of the Interior, makes a public announcement and notifies condemnees (Article 18 of the LEA). Except for land value compensation (which is discussed in Section B), I
introduce the appraisal methods for these compensations in turn. Compensation for agricultural improvements "shall be determined based on the value of the ripened crops thereof, provided the crops are due to ripen in less than one year from the date of expropriation, or based on the cost incurred in their planting and cultivation with reference to their current value, provided the crops are due to ripen in more than one year from the date of expropriation" (Article 31 of the LEA). The 8 I omit the discussion of compensation for contiguous land (not condemned but affected).
9 For a study on illegal buildings in Taiwan, see Chang and Smith (2015) .
Ministry of the Interior has enacted incredibly detailed tables for determining the 
B. Appraisal of Land Value
Assessment of land value is the most complicated and controversial part of determining the amount of takings compensation, as appraisal of land value now is not formulaic and land value takes up a lion's share of the total takings compensation.
Before 2012, determining the compensable land value was mechanical. Chang (2009; has shown that a majority of condemnees were under-compensated under the old regime, which relied on official land value for tax purposes in the critical calculation. This section introduces and evaluates the new regime. My reform proposal will appear in Part VIII.
Condemnees shall receive "current market value" as compensation for expropriation of their land (Article 30 of the LEA). The Land Value Evaluation Committee in each city/county government determines the current market value.
11
The Committee is not itself an agency; rather, it makes decisions in the name of the local city/county government. The compensation is paid from the budget of the land use applicant. Below is a summary of how current market value is assessed and adjusted. adjustment. The approved unit land will then be used for condemnations taking place in the next, "current year" (Y2=Y1+1).
14 Market value of land fluctuates on a daily basis, so an up-to-date land value has to be estimated for land expropriations that take place after July 1 of the current year.
An adjustment ratio should be computed based on the relative estimated price on if the current market value of the baseline year has been publicly announced and notified to the condemnees, and the adjusted current market value of the current year is lower than the former value, the higher market value of the baseline year shall still be used to compensate the condemnees (Article 30 of the Enforcement Rules for the LEA).
C. Judicial Review
Administrative courts defer to the local governments' assessment of current 16 That is, the 25% highest and 25% lowest unit prices are excluded. The average prices of the rest of the unit prices in both periods are calculated separately and then compared.
Adjustment ratio=average price in the current period / average price in the baseline period. market value. In the pre-2012 regime, takings compensation was determined by the pre-announced official land value. Administrative courts' hesitation in giving the official values a hard look is understandable, but not justified. In the post-2012 regime, however, the legislature prescribes compensation of current market value. As current market value is an objective, verifiable fact that anyone with the right training can estimate, administrative courts should substantively review the estimates of current market value by the governments, rather than deferring to them. So far (until October 10, 2014), I have found 6 administrative court cases which apply the new Article 30 of the LEA. In all six cases, however, the courts defer to the local governments. In Chang (2013c), I found that administrative courts in Taiwan before 2012 only conducted a "procedural review" of takings compensation determination, rather than a "substantive review." That is, administrative courts only examined whether all the procedures stipulated in the regulations and statutes were followed. If they were, administrative courts assumed that the estimates were correct, or at least worthy of their deference. It appears that this mindset has not changed.
V. OVERALL DUE PROCESS
The due process for takings and its preceding procedures stipulated by the LEA is shown in a flow chart, Figure The current practice of negotiated purchase is still in flux. Taoyuan County still relied on the pre-2012 regime, using Publicly Announced Land Value (an official land value for property tax purposes) plus a 40 percent bonus, claiming that this would
give condemnees more than the government-assessed market value-which, I should note, probably is below the real market value. By contrast, the New Taipei City commissioned independent real estate appraisers to assess the market value to be offered to condemnees. I cannot find any data on how often land use applicants 
VIII. EVALUATING THE TAKINGS REGIME IN TAIWAN
The 2012 reform of the LEA marks the third major change of takings compensation since 1949 (Chang 2013b) . Generally speaking, this latest reform may be optimal in terms of law in books. Of course, it is the law in action that matters for the condemnees and the general public. As the new LEA is still young, it is unclear whether the amended regime can guarantee condemnees with the basic respect they deserve in a democracy. This chapter has offered evidence for worries, as the administrative agencies have not shown significant changes in their course of business and the administrative courts appear to be deferential as usual. Given an inactive court, one should not rely too heavily on the administrative court to raise the standard of review of the public interest in takings cases. If land value appraisals are still considered highly technical matters that only the governments or the real estate appraisers they hire can understand, administrative courts will still pass on reviewing these critical decisions. This part advances a new approach, under which estimation of market value of condemned land through hedonic regression models with block-level sale data is mandatory. By making the estimation more transparent, I hope that courts will become more willing to review the decision. Provided that condemnees can really receive market value as compensation, it leaves much less room for governments to condemn unnecessary land. This is the law of demand.
Real estate appraisers in Taiwan, like their colleagues elsewhere, still largely rely on the conventional method to estimate market value. Appraisals are handiwork, based on experience, and their subjectivity makes them unlikely to be contested.
The era of big data has come to Taiwan, and hedonic regression models that utilize big data to assess market value of land have become too powerful to ignore.
Actual market sale prices of real estates had been kept secret for decades. None other than the transacting parties themselves (and perhaps their agents) knew the actual prices. Transaction taxes were levied based on official land value, not actual sale prices. As a result, no one had large enough data to utilize regression models.
Things changed, however, in 2012. As part of his presidential re-election campaign, President MA Ying-jeou advocated "residential justice." The legislature passed or revised five statutes, three of which mandate that the actual sale prices of immovable properties be reported to the government. The "actual price report" regime came into effect on August 1, 2012. The raw data are available for download, and the competent agency, the Ministry of the Interior, started a website that enables users to check sale prices in any region in Taiwan through a graphic interface. 18 Users can also acquire information on that website regarding the transacting month, total area, zoning, layout of the apartment (such as how many rooms), etc. (Chang 2015) .
New and larger data sets are churned out every day. From August 2012 to February 2013 alone, there were 188,900 reported sales of land and/or building. The data regarding the sales of land are summarized in Table 3 . From August 2012 to
November 2014, the reported number of sales of land and/or building increased to 840,165.
With these (ever-increasing) sets of data and a properly specified hedonic regression model, market value of any land parcel in Taiwan since August 2012 can be estimated with pretty high accuracy. My co-authors and I have developed a hedonic regression model elsewhere (Chang, Chen, and Lin 2014) . The model, introduced in details below, is an ordinary least square (OLS) model with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the actual sale price. The independent variables control for the land size, zoning, transaction month, and the number of plots involved. The models take the following form:
where P is natural log of sale prices; A is natural log of land area; N is natural log of the number of land plots involved; Z are 9 zoning dummies that capture 10 types of zonings: non-urban (agricultural-not prime), non-urban (agricultural-prime), non- scientists who do quantitative work will agree that an R-square of 0.73 is very satisfactory. With more data and more information to improve the model, using hedonic regression models to estimate market value will become more and more accurate in Taiwan.
19 The stratum classification is based on Hou et al. (2008) .
I am not proposing the banishment of real estate appraisers from the takings procedure. Not at all. There is a confidence interval in any statistical estimates, and hedonic regression models are vulnerable to idiosyncrasy of land characteristics.
Instead of entirely relying on statistical methods or subjective appraisals, why not get the best of both worlds? The governments can (and, I think, should) use the estimates (with, say, a 95% or 90% confidence interval) by the hedonic regression model as the benchmark, and require real estate appraisers to adjust the benchmark, if necessary.
The appraisal reports should detail the reasons for the adjustments. Both the regression estimates and the appraisal reports should be provided to the landowners no later than the negotiated purchase stage. The informed landowners can then decide to accept the offer or challenge the amount of takings compensation later. Market value appraisal is objective, and local governments and real estate appraisers should thus be held more accountable than before by administrative courts. In other words, administrative courts should no longer defer on appraisal matters. Rather, experts hired by the condemnees should be allowed to debate the merits of the land value assessed by local governments. Administrative courts should commission independent appraisers to evaluate the quality of the appraisal reports by both sides. In the long run, only a more active court can bring equity to the condemnees. Chang, Chen, and Lin (2014) . 
